1. The contractor`s accounting system shall be sufficient to provide data to support the negotiation of the final revision of costs and incentive prices. and beyond the maximum price, the contractor is always obliged to deliver in accordance with the contract. The FPI(F) belongs to the family of “fixed price” contracts and therefore contains a “default” clause (FAR 52.249-8 to -10). In accordance with this clause, the Contractor will be faced with the remedies of the Standard Clause, including termination for default. According to FAR 16.403-1, the FPI(F) type of contract can only be used if a target contract of a fixed-price incentive company also contains a specific formula for calculating profit adjustments. This formula is sometimes referred to as: 5) Structuring multi-incentive contracts (FAR 16.402-4) A well-structured multiple incentive agreement should motivate the entrepreneur to strive for exceptional results in all incentive areas. (c) Billing Price. For fixed-price incentive contracts, settlement prices are set as the basis for provisional payment. These settlement prices may be adjusted within the ceilings at the request of one of the Parties if it appears that the final negotiated costs will differ materially from the target costs. (a) Description.

A fixed-price incentive contract is a fixed-price contract that provides for the adjustment of the profit and the determination of the final price of the contract by applying a formula based on the ratio between the total final costs negotiated and the total target costs. The final price is subject to a price cap, which is negotiated at the beginning. The two forms of fixed-price incentive contracts, fixed objectives and successive objectives, are described in paragraphs 16 403-1 and 16 403-2 below. Unless otherwise stated in the contract, the government will never pay more than the maximum price set. This contract makes it possible to adjust the profit and set the final price by applying a formula. Typically, this formula determines how the customer and service provider allocate the difference between end and target costs. However, the default clause is not included in refund contracts. Under reimbursement contracts, contractors are only required to do their best to comply with the estimated total cost clause (FAR 52.216-20).

If a contractor does not deliver within the estimated total cost, they can revise their estimated total cost to complete the effort, and the government will decide whether or not to provide additional funding. An incentive contract (Subpart 16.4 of the Federal Procurement Regulations (FAR)) is appropriate if a fixed-price contract (SPF) is not reasonable and the required supplies or services can be purchased at a lower cost and the amount of profit or fees payable under the contract may be related to the performance of the contractor. Incentive contracts are used to achieve specific acquisition objectives by: On the other hand, a standard clause is generally not included in contracts related to reimbursement. Under these agreements, the Contractor will only be required to do its best to operate within the established estimated total cost of ownership, also known as the cost limitation clause, as described in FAR 52.216-20. The earnings adjustment formula is also known as a “share quota” or “sharing agreement” and is represented graphically by a “stock line”. The earnings adjustment formula is usually expressed as a ratio, with the “government share” in the numerator and the “entrepreneur`s share” in the denominator. Figure 2 shows a dividing line of the “80/20” profit adjustment formula and shows how costs are allocated between the parties between series (below target costs) and overflows (above target costs). The final FPIF element is the “Full Acceptance Point (PTA)”. The ATP indicates where the cost sharing on the costs ends and the contractor fully assumes the risk of cost overruns. For the PTA, the price calculated according to the price adjustment formula corresponds to the maximum price (the calculations for the PTA are listed at the end of this article).

Beyond the PTA, the price of the share line exceeds the price ceiling; Therefore, the “price cap” replaces the stock line. As shown in Figure 2, the price cap and stock line overlap at the PTA. In undercutting scenarios, the entrepreneur achieves the total target profit plus the “entrepreneur`s share” (20% in this example) of the underutilization under the price adjustment formula. In overflow scenarios up to PTA, the entrepreneur must subtract the “entrepreneur`s share” (20% in this example) from the overflow of the target profit. Beyond the PTA, the price of the share line exceeds the price ceiling; As a result, the price cap comes into effect and the contractor`s profit is reduced by $1 for every $1 overflow – the REIT(F) contract essentially becomes a fixed-price contract. Subject to other contractual conditions, the government will in no case pay more than the maximum price. 4) Delivery Incentives (FAR 16.402-3) Delivery incentives should be considered if improvement over a required delivery schedule is a key government objective. It is important to determine the government`s main objectives in a particular contract (p.B.

earliest possible delivery or earliest volume production). The price target is the sum of the target costs and benefits. A contract of this type must also indicate the maximum price, but not a maximum or minimum profit. This is the maximum amount that the contractor will receive after the completion of the project. It excludes all permissible adjustments described in other clauses of the contract. (a) Description. A fixed-price incentive contract (fixed target) specifies a cost target, a target profit, a price cap (but not a profit cap or floor), and a profit adjustment formula. These elements are all negotiated at the beginning. The price cap is the maximum amount that can be paid to the contractor, with the exception of adjustments based on other contractual clauses.

When the contractor completes the service, the parties negotiate the final costs and the final price is determined by applying the formula. If the final cost is less than the target cost, the application of the formula gives a final gain greater than the target gain; Conversely, if the final cost is higher than the target cost, the application of the formula results in a final gain below the target gain, or even a net loss. If the negotiated final costs exceed the price cap, the contractor will consider the difference as a loss. Since profit varies inversely with costs, this type of contract provides a positive and calculable incentive for profit for the entrepreneur to control costs. This type of contract can only be used if, at the time of the first negotiation of the contract, reasonable information on costs or prices is available to set reasonable fixed targets. In addition, there is always an upper limit or price cap on an FPIF contract. All accumulated costs that exceed this upper limit are the responsibility of the service provider. There are a number of different variants of the FPIF contract. The Client and the Service Provider must accept these Conditions before commencing the work in order to avoid any future confusion or dispute.